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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Appeal is from a final Order (Summary Judgment) of
the Seventh District Court of San Juan County, State of Utah
(Honorable Bryce K. Bryner).

Everett Thomas, the plaintiff-

appellant, appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j).

The Utah

Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4), "poured"
this Appeal "over" to this Court.

This Court has jurisdiction

over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
11

•

STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The sole issue presented by this Appeal is whether the
District Court committed reversible error by determining that
defendant-appellee Board of Education of the San Juan School
District ("the District") owed no duty of care to Mr. Thomas
and by, accordingly, granting the District's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
(STANDARD OF REVIEW)
Summary Judgment should be affirmed only if there is no
genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

The appellate court

reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness.
E.g., Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah 1993).
The appellate court does not defer to the trial court's ruling

1

on appeal of a grant of summary judgment.

E.g.,

Cannon v.

University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993).

On

review of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court
views the facts, and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.

Id.
(ISSUE PRESERVED IN TRIAL COURT)

This issue was preserved in the District Court by
Mr. Thomas's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment (R. at 181-254) and at oral argument,
presented January 29, 1999, in opposition to that Motion.
III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND
DISPOSITION IN THE DISTRICT COURT

This is a significant personal (burn) injury case, in
which Mr. Thomas seeks substantial monetary compensation, f
the damages he has sustained and will sustain as proximate
results of the alleged negligence of the District (by and
through one or more of its employees) in connection with a
fire that occurred, on May 24, 1994, in a vehicle (a 1984
Chevrolet Suburban) owned and operated by the District, at
Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") Boarding School in Aneth,
Utah.

2

Mr. Thomas alleged (and continues to contend) that the
District breached, in several alternative respects, its duty
of care to him and that the District's breach or breaches
proximately caused him to sustain damages.

After discovery

had been completed and when the scheduled trial-commencement
date was approaching, the District moved for Summary Judgment
and submitted its Memorandum in support of that Motion (R. at
137-68), contending that it owed Mr. Thomas no duty of care
that it could conceivably have breached.

Mr. Thomas submitted

his Memorandum in Opposition to the District's Motion.
181-254.

R. at

The District submitted its Reply Memorandum in

support of that Motion.

R. at 262-68.

On January 29, 1999, Judge Bryner heard oral arguments on
the Motion and took that Motion under advisement.

On

February 1, 1999, Judge Bryner rendered his "Ruling on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment," R. at 269-71,
determining that the District was entitled to Summary Judgment
on the basis that it owed no duty of care to Mr. Thomas, and
directing counsel for the District to prepare an appropriate
formal order.

On February 25, 1999, Judge Bryner entered the

Order on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
75.

R. at 272-

On March 16, 1999, Mr. Thomas filed, in the Seventh

District Court, his Notice of Appeal from that Order.

3

R. at

284-85.

That Notice was filed in the Utah Supreme Court on
On June 23, 1999, the Utah Supreme Court

March 18, 1999.

transferred this Appeal to this Court.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

At the time of the accident, Mr. Thomas was a

teacher at the BIA school in Aneth.

Deposition of Everett

Thomas, at 10 (R. at 160).
2.

Ms. Robin Benallie, a teacher-employee of the

District, had driven a group of her students to the BIA
School, in the subject Suburban, to put on a play.

Deposition

of Robin Benallie at 4, 5, 8 (R. at 149-51); Deposition of
Robert Sanders (the District's resident automotive expert
employee) at 34 (R. at 157).
3.

After completing their performance,

Ms. Benallie and the students loaded the Suburban for their
return trip, but the car wouldn't start.

Benallie depo. at

42-43 (R. at 152-53).
4.

The subject Suburban had a history, known to

the District, through its agents, of a specific mechanical
problem, to wit:

it would "vapor lock," rendering it

temporarily incapable of being operated after the time that
condition manifested itself.

E.g.,

deposition of James A.

Haws (another District employee knowledgeable regarding

4

automotive issues) at 3; 6-10; 13-15; 18-19; 21-23; 26-27; 3839; 44 (R. at 196-202; 204-05); Sanders depo. at 3; 11-12; 1723; 28-29 (R. at 213-14; 216-19).
5.

The District, through its agents, allowed

another of its agents, Ms. Benallie, to take the Suburban on
the subject trip even though defendant knew of the likelihood
that it would "vapor lock" during the subject trip.

Haws

depo. at 40-41; 59 (R. at 204-05; 208); Sanders depo. at 13;
28; 36 (R. at 215; 218; 220).
6.

Ms. Benallie herself, although she is not

mechanically inclined (Benallie depo. at 24-26; 28; 66-68 (R.
at 230-31; 233)), and although she testified that the term
"vapor lock" meant nothing to her (Benallie depo. At 71 (R. at
234)), knew that defendant had concerns about the wisdom of
her taking the Suburban on the subject trip.

Benallie depo.

at 31 (R. at 232).
7.

The District knew, through its agents, of the

foreseeablility of safety risks, specific and general,
associated with the Suburban's "vapor lock" condition.

E.g.,

Sanders depo. at 36; 38-39; 45-47 (R. at 220-21; 223).
8.

The reason that the Suburban wouldn't start, in

connection with the subject incident, was that it had "vapor

5

locked."

Haws depo. at 51 (R. at 207); Sanders depo. at 36;

45 (R. at 220; 223).
9.

Ms. Benallie was herself concerned, while

Mr. Thomas was in the process, in her presence, of trying to
get the engine started, with the dangerousness of the
situation.

Benallie depo. at 67-68 (R. at 233) .
10.

A short while before the fire occurred,

Ms. Benallie approached Starr Ebert, a maintenance man at the
BIA Boarding School, told him that the Suburban would not
start, and asked him for help.

Affidavit of Starr Ebert,

para. 3 (R. at 256).
11.

Either Ms. Benallie gave Mr. Ebert the keys to

the Suburban or they were already in the Suburban.

Id.,

para.

4.
12.

Mr. Ebert and a co-employee then tried to start

the engine, while Ms. Benallie was back inside the school
building, by pouring gasoline from a coffee can into the
carburetor, in a fashion that Mr. Ebert did not think was
dangerous and in which he had started other vehicles.

Id.,

paras. 5-8.
13.

Mr. Thomas, who arrived on the scene about the

time Ms. Benallie emerged from the school building, tried to
help with the starting of the engine in the same fashion that

6

Mr. Ebert and his co-employee had been pursuing.

Affidavit of

Starr Ebert, paras. 9, 12 (R. at 256-57).
14.

Mr. Thomas poured gasoline on the carburetor

while Mr. Ebert turned the ignition.

Thomas depo. at 24; 30

(R. at 163; 166).
15.

On Mr. Thomas's third attempt to start the car

in that fashion, flames erupted from the engine compartment,
burning Mr. Thomas and Ms. Benallie.

Thomas depo. at 30; 31

(R. at 166-67); Benallie depo. at 50 (R. at 154).
16.

Mr. Thomas had previously started a car by

pouring gas on the carburetor.

Thomas depo. at 26 (R. at

164) .
17.

Prior to the accident, Mr. Thomas knew there

was a potential risk involved in trying to start a car by
pouring gas on the carburetor.

Thomas depo. at 31-32 (R. at

167-68).
18.

Although she had been instructed, prior to the

commencement of the trip to Aneth, to let the engine cool off,
before trying to restart it (Sanders depo. at 36-37; 43-44;
53-54; 56 (R. at 220-22; 224)) and, after the problem remanifested itself, to let the engine cool off for two or three
hours and to lock the Suburban up and bring the keys back to
the school (Haws depo. at 24-26; 45-46; Ex. 1 to Haws depo.
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(R. at 201-02; 206; 210)), Ms. Benallie did not give any
instructions to anyone and did not try to stop Mr. Thomas, or
anyone else, from trying to start the engine in the way being
attempted by Mr. Ebert, his co-employee, and Mr. Thomas.
Ebert Aff. paras. 11, 12 (R. at 256-57); Thomas depo. at 27;
56 (R. at 243-44).
19.

A vehicle owned by the District that had any

possible safety problems should not have been driven and
should have been taken out of service.

Deposition of Ronald

Barlow (former principal of the District's Whitehorse High
School - the facility from which the Suburban's ill-fated trip
began) at 6; 16; 40 (R. at 248-250)).
IV.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Summary Judgment is generally inappropriate in negligence
cases.

This case presents no exception to that general rule.

The District owed Mr. Thomas a duty of care, and significant
triable questions of fact remain for jury determination.
The District had a duty of care, to a reasonably
foreseeable universe of persons, including Mr. Thomas, to
maintain the Suburban in a reasonably safe condition, even if
Ms. Benallie had not requested help and even if she had not
been present while the incident was occurring.

8

The District owed Mr. Thomas a particular duty of care by
reason of Ms. Benallie's requesting help and knowingly
allowing Mr. Thomas to perform dangerous work on a vehicle
that the District knew was in unsafe mechanical condition when
it left on the subject trip.
The District also owed Mr. Thomas a duty of care
satisfactorily to train and supervise its employees.
This Court should reverse the District Court and remand
this case for trial.
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GENERALLY INAPPROPRIATE IN
NEGLIGENCE CASES. THIS CASE IS NO EXCEPTION.

It is well settled that the question of negligence is
ordinarily one of fact for the jury, and that summary judgment
is appropriate only in clear-cut cases.
785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990).

See Hunt v. Hurst,

See, also, English v. Kienke,

774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App. 1989) (summary judgment should
be granted with great caution when negligence is alleged;
summary judgment is reversed for only the most clear-cut
negligence cases); Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d
821, 825 (Utah App. 1989) (as a general proposition, summary
judgment is inappropriate to resolve a negligence claim on its
merits).

9

It is also universally held that proximate cause is a
factual issue which in most cases may not appropriately be
resolved on a motion for summary judgment.

See Apache Tank

Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); Unigard
Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344, 1347 (Utah 1984).
The law recognizes a party's entitlement to having the
trier (s) of fact decide a party's claims unless it appears
that, even upon the facts claimed by that party, he or she
could not establish a basis for recovery.

"When there is

doubt about the matter, it should be resolved in favor of
permitting the party to go to trial."

Id.

(Emphasis added.)

There may be more than one proximate cause of the same
injury or damages.

If the negligence of two or more persons

combines to produce an injury, and the negligence of each of
them is a proximate cause of the injury, then those persons
must share liability for the resulting injury and damages, in
proportion to their respective shares of fault.

Anderson v.

Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 647 P.2d 45
(1970); Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 154, 449 P.2d 996 (1969);
Jacques v. Farrimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133 (1963).
The District had, as will be explained below, a duty of
care to Mr. Thomas.

The fact that a jury might well determine

that Mr. Thomas was, despite his good intentions, negligent

10

and that that negligence was a legal cause of his significant
burn injuries is not, under the relevant statutory scheme
(Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 to -43), the end of the inquiry.
For a jury might also reasonably determine that the District
had substantial causal fault for failing to take reasonable
steps to make the Suburban safe; for allowing it to be
operated in remote areas of the State in an unsafe condition;
for Ms. Benallie's allowing (after the District had put things
in motion) Mr. Thomas to do what he did; and/or for the
District's failure adequately to train and/or supervise its
employees.
This is simply not a case in which summary judgment was
appropriately granted.
B.

THE DISTRICT HAD A DUTY THAT RAN TO MR. THOMAS TO
KEEP THE SUBURBAN IN GOOD AND SAFE OPERATING
CONDITION, A DUTY THAT RAN TO MR. THOMAS BY REASON
OF MS. BENALLIE'S ACTS AND OMISSIONS IN LIGHT OF HER
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SITUATION, AND A DUTY THAT
RAN TO MR. THOMAS SATISFACTORILY TO TRAIN AND
SUPERVISE ITS EMPLOYEES.

It is beyond question that the District, as the owner and
operator of the Suburban (e.g., Sanders depo. at 58 (R. at
225); Benallie depo. at 17-18 (R. at 229)), had the legal duty
to maintain that vehicle in good and safe operating condition.
Section 307 of the Restatement, Second, of Torts, provides:
It is negligence to use an instrumentality, whether
a human being or thing, which the actor knows or

11

should know to be so incompetent, inappropriate, or
defective, that its use involves an unreasonable
risk of harm to others.
(Emphasis added.)
It has been held, specific to the automobile context,
that the owner of a vehicle may be held liable to a third
person for personal injuries caused by a defective condition
of which the owner had or should have had knowledge.

E.g.,

Murry v. Advanced Asphalt Co., 751 P.2d 209 (Okla. App. 1987);
Bush v. Middleton, 304 P.2d 474, 475 (Okla. 1975).

It has

also been held, under traditional negligence concepts, that an
owner's knowledge, actual or constructive, of a defective
condition of a thing that he, she, or it owns, gives rise to
the duty to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious
consequences resulting from such a condition.

E.g.,

Kent v.

Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 S.2d 493, 497 (La. 1982).
The duty in question is to anyone who might foreseeably1
be endangered by a breach of that duty.

1

It is, at a bare

One fact apparently overlooked by Judge Bryner should be kept
squarely in mind by this Court. Of apparently considerable
significance to Judge Bryner's Ruling was the proposition (R.
at 271) that "it was not foreseeable that the Plaintiff would
voluntarily attempt to assist the Defendant by pouring
gasoline in the carburetor...." The problem with the "nonforeseeability" conclusion is not only that the record belies
(see record citations set forth in Fact No. 7 (supra),
p. 5 ) ,
as even a general matter, that conclusion. Judge Bryner
appears clearly to have overlooked the fact that Mr. Thomas
was doing what he was doing before the very eyes of
12

minimum, a matter of triable fact that the District breached
that duty; and that duty has nothing to do with the "special
relationship" tangent off on which the District will (based on
the approach taken by the District in the District Court
proceedings) contend this Court's analysis should go. 2
As explained by the Utah Supreme Court, in Hoffman v.
Life Ins. Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, "the doctrine of
foreseeability is used in tort law to establish the scope of
the duty of a person to exercise reasonable care to avoid
harming others."

Id.

at 416 (emphasis added).

Courts take a

broad view of the class of risks and the class of victims who

Ms. Benallie, a District agent, just as those chargeable with
maintaining the Suburban were District agents. A conclusion
of "non-foreseeability," in this factual context, is clearly
erroneous.
2

Mr. Thomas submits that the fact situation here, in light of
the District's allowing the unsafely maintained Suburban to
travel the roadways of San Juan County and in light of
Ms. Benallie's conduct (she requested help and stood by while
something she knew to be dangerous was occurring), amounts
even more clearly to a duty to Mr. Thomas, and a possible
breach thereof, than the example set forth in the following
Illustration 3 of Comment d to Section 314 of the Restatement,
Second, of Torts:
A, a trespasser in the freight yard of the B Railroad
Company, falls in the path of a slowly moving train. The
conductor of the train sees A, and by signalling the
engineer could readily stop the train in time to prevent
its running over A, but does not do so. While a
bystander would not be liable to A for refusing to give a
signal, the B Railroad is subject to liability for

13

are foreseeable for the purpose of the existence of a duty of
care.

E.g.,

Rudolph v. Arizona B.A.S.S. Federation, 898 P.2d

1000, 1002 (Az. App. 1995).

And there is no requirement that

a foreseeable plaintiff must be connected with or personally
known to a defendant for a duty to exist.

E.g.,

Alhambra

School District v. Superior Court, 796 P.2d 470 (1990).

In

determining whether a defendant in a negligence case owes a
duty to a plaintiff, an important consideration is
foreseeability; and, as a general rule,
... a defendant owes a duty of care to all persons who
are foreseeably endangered by his conduct with
respect to all risks which make the conduct
unreasonably dangerous.
Blaine v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 850 P.2d 346, 348 (Okla.
App. 1992) (quoting from Wofford v. Eastern Estate Hospital,
795 P.2d 516, 519 (Okla. 1990)) (emphasis added).
Application of this foreseeability analysis should have
worked to defeat the District's Motion even if Ms. Benallie
had not been present when the incident occurred.
a fortiori,

It follows,

that the District's duty to Mr. Thomas, on the

uncontested facts of this case, has been clearly established.
Alternatively and if the Court somehow determines that a
"special relationship" analysis should be undertaken, it

permitting the train to continue in motion with knowledge
of A's peril.
14

should be noted that Ms. Benallie (an employee and agent of
the District) having asked for help (Ebert Aff., para. 3 (R.
at 256)), assumed responsibility for the safety of Mr. Thomas
when she stood by, without doing anything to try to stop
Mr. Thomas, despite having received instructions essentially
to the contrary from Mr. Haws:
... we will ... find 'a special relationship and
consequent duty when a defendant knew of the likely
danger to an individual or distinct group of
individuals or when a defendant should have known of
such danger,' [Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d
231, 240 (Utah 1993)]
Drysdale v. Rogers, 869 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1994).
Also (and although the Court likely does not need to
reach the issue), it is also beyond dispute that an employer,
such as the defendant in this case, has the duty to supervise
its employees {e.g.,

J.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115,

124 (Utah 1992); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053,
1059 (Utah 1992)), such as Ms. Benallie, the mechanically
unschooled person who was driving the Suburban full of
schoolchildren, who asked for help, and who, as a matter of
triable fact, stood mute and passive -- even after having been
given instructions essentially to the contrary.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Mr. Thomas urges the Court to recognize that the no-duty
argument, the only argument advanced by the District and the

15

only basis on which the District Court granted Summary
Judgment, is one
rejected.

that should, in the instant context, be

It is well established, "black-letter" law that

negligence can lie in acting or omitting to act, and the
District's failures here are much more akin, for example, to
the longstanding failure of a store owner with actual
knowledge of the presence of a dangerous condition afoot on
its premises to take action to address that condition (a
clearly actionable omission, with respect to any user of its
premises), or, for example, to that of an automobile operator
who carelessly omits to move his vehicle from the middle of an
intersection, than it is to no-duty "special relationship"
situations whose significant factual scenarios start, and end,
with a simple failure to act when no pre-existing duty exists.
And, as the District candidly recognized, near the top of page
5 of the initial Memorandum it submitted in support of its
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 143) in the District Court
proceedings, "[a]ny inferences to be drawn from the underlying
facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion."
Mr. Thomas, a severely burn-injured, foreseeable (and, by
Ms. Benallie, actually "seen") "good Samaritan" on the
uncontested facts of this case, urges this Court, by reason of

16

the foregoing analysis, in light of the general proposition
that any doubts should be resolved in favor of allowing
litigants to have their claims resolved by juries, and in the
interest of justice, to reverse the District Court and remand
this action for trial.
Respectfully submit ted this

^

-tfc
day of August, 1999,

PETER C. CO~LLINS
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
ERIC P. SWENSON
Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant, Everett Thomas
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by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Brent A. Burnett
Barbara E. Ochoa
Assistant Attorney General
Jan Graham (A1231)
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Post Office Box 140856
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0856
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ADDENDUM

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County
RLEL

'

FEB - 3 1999
OLCIKK OF THE COURT ~

BY. , ,._
DEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
EVERETT THOMAS,

:
:

RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:

Case No. 9607-50

Plaintiff,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
SAN JUAN SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to which the
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Objection. Oral argument was heard
on January 29, 1999.

The Court took the matter under advisement

and now issues this ruling.
Defendant contends that it did not owe a duty of due care to
the Plaintiff at the time of his accident, and that he therefore
cannot establish a claim for negligence against the Defendant. The
Plaintiff responds that the Defendant did owe the Plaintiff a duty
of due care.
Although the Court finds that the Plaintiff owed a duty of due
care to properly maintain the 1984 Suburban, the Court finds that
the Plaintiff does not fall within the ambit of those persons to
whim the duty was owed.

The 1984 Suburban was disabled in a

parking lot, allegedly with "vapor lock," when the Plaintiff
offered to help without being asked by Defendant or any of its
agents.

fJ^

y

The Court cannot find, on the basis of the record, that

0001

2

the Defendant, through any of its agents, including Ms. Benallie,
assumed responsibility for the safety of the Plaintiff who was a
"volunteer."

Under the circumstances of this case, there were no

"special relationships" existing between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant as discussed in Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 312
(Utah 1986) at 415, that would impose a duty to protect the
Plaintiff.
The Court also finds that it was not foreseeable that the
Plaintiff would voluntarily attempt to assist the Defendant by
pouring gasoline in the carburetor with the attendant injury.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff was not within the scope of those
persons to whom the duty was owed.
Based on the foregoing, the Motion for Summary Judgment is
granted. Defendant's counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate
summary judgment.
DATED this J_

0002

*
day of February, 1999.

3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

/

day of February, 1999, a

true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Peter C. Collins
James E. Morton
Attorneys at Law
4021 South 700 East, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Eric P. Swenson
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 940
Monticello, Utah

84535

Barbara E. Ochoa
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140856
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856

L jdi Lv,

In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act,
individuals needing special accommodations (including
communicative aids and services) during this proceeding
should call 1-800-992-1072, at least THREE working
days prior to the scheduled proceeding.
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